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Conglomerate Mergers: Comparison with Vertical Foreclosure1 
Adrian J Proctor2 
Abstract 
This article compares and contracts the approach to merger issues in vertical and conglomerate cases 
including likely efficiencies, useful data, and the approach to looking at each of ability, incentive, and 
effect in turn. The paper considers when conglomerate mergers are more likely to mirror vertical cases 
and result in static price rises. The article considers the relationship between conglomerate 
foreclosure and predatory pricing to determine whether merger analysis is the most suitable place to 
intervene and stop short-term benefits that may harm competition in the longer term. Finally, 
potential amendments to the existing framework are discussed. 
Introduction 
A vertical merger is one between a firm and one of its suppliers or customers. The merger involves 
firms that are not in competition with each other, but which are involved in the same supply chain 
and so the output of each of the firms is combined to form some combination product that includes 
both elements. A conglomerate merger can be any merger that does not involve competitors (in the 
same antitrust market) or firms in the same vertical supply chain. 3  Conglomerate mergers often 
involve firms that supply complementary products (products that increase the value or functionality 
of the other product such as shavers and razor blades). They can also involve products with a common 
set of buyers, but since complementary products usually need to be purchased by the same customer 
in order to generate the increase in value, a conglomerate merger can be considered for convenience 
as a merger between two suppliers of different products that are often bought by the same customers 
(i.e. where many customers of one of the products also buy the other product). Competition concerns 
can sometimes occur in conglomerate mergers where (at least one) of the individual products has pre-
merger market power. 
Vertical and conglomerate mergers are both non-horizontal and are both usually analysed by 
considering the potential foreclosure of rivals under a structure of ability, incentive, and effect. There 
are many similarities between the appropriate analysis in a vertical and a conglomerate merger as 
well as some key differences to be aware of. This paper will explain the significance of some of the 
similarities and differences and then explain how the traditional ability, incentive and effect analysis 
                                                          
1 This is an early unedited version of an article that has now been published as Proctor, Adrian J. “Conglomerate 
Mergers: Lessons from Vertical Foreclosure” World Competition 38.4 (2015): 571–596. 
2Adrian Proctor has been a member of the phase 1 mergers team at the Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA) (adrian.proctor@cma.gsi.gov.uk). The views in this article are not necessarily those of the Competition 
and Markets Authority or any other authority. Invaluable support for this article has been received from 
Ioannis Kokkoris. The Author previously discussed the analysis of coordinated effects in mergers in Proctor, 
Adrian J. "Identifying Geographic or Customer-Based Collusion." World Competition 38.2 (2015): 253-280 and 
Proctor, Adrian J. "TACIT COLLUSION INDICATORS IN MERGER CONTROL UNDER VARIED FOCAL POINTS." 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 10.4 (2014): 959-987. 
3 Sometimes diagonal mergers (firms at different levels in the supply chains supplying competing products) are 
also excluded from consideration as conglomerate mergers. 
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can be updated and clarified as well as more general comments on the important features of 
conglomerate mergers to be aware of. 
Damien Neven wrote one of the most influential summaries of the analysis of conglomerate effects in 
mergers.4 For conglomerate effects to apply there needs to be common buyers to link the products. 
It does not matter whether the products are (weak) substitutes, complements or in independent 
demand and the EC guidelines accept that conglomerate effects may apply to all of these cases.  
Several issues raised as potential conglomerate effects in past cases are not likely to cause harm. If 
there are (supplier or buyer) economies of scale then there is no harm caused by this improvement 
(reduction in merged firm costs) unless there is exit. Such exit is unlikely where the merging firms are 
in neighbouring markets. If there are brand spillovers and concerns that the merged firm can use 
strong brands to promote weak brands then it is unclear whether the incentive exists for the merged 
firm to support one brand over another. This would amount to a change in marketing strategy and as 
with other such changes the overall impact on consumer welfare is unclear. There have been 
conglomerate cases that have looked at potential competition but this issue is just a different 
horizontal theory (not conglomerate) that accepts that the market definition is different from the 
market for competition analysis. Normally for the leveraging product to be must stock or dominant 
the merged firm must get at least 35% of its revenue from that market.5 Adverse competition effects 
are unlikely if a competitor can match the bundled portfolio.  
In the Tetra/Sidel packaging machine merger there was a concern about predatory pricing.6 Most of 
the analysis in the case was about the existence of a common pool of customers so that a discount 
could be offered on one product if the customers bought the other product. To do this effectively the 
firm would have needed to be able to tell which customers wanted both and so should be targeted 
for the bundle discount. The original decision was more about the static incentives to bundle with less 
emphasis on competitor exit.  
In the GE/Honeywell aviation parts merger both firms had 50% or a leading market position 
respectively in their segments.7 The concern was mixed bundling which would be predatory to induce 
exit of competitors. Alternatively the position of GE capital could be used to favour the parties 
(another short term costly strategy involving sacrifice) to induce exit. 
The model used in the Neven paper has a monopoly product A with the maximum price of the bundle 
under unit demand being the price of the two products when sold separately. The bundle can be 
profitable only if the firm commits to this (pure bundle) and exit occurs. If the B product market is 
(less) differentiated then offering only a pure bundle can increase differentiation between the two 
                                                          
4 The analysis of conglomerate effects in EU merger control, Damien Neven, December 2005. Advances in the 
Economics of Competition Law”, MIT Press. 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/conglomerate.pdf 
5 Retailers have many means to counter bundling and negotiate with suppliers including about shelf space, by 
sponsoring entry or launching private labels. 
6 Case COMP/M.2416 TETRA LAVAL/ SIDEL 2003. 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2416_62_en.pdf 
7 Case COMP/M.2220 General Electric/Honeywell 2001. 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf 
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options (that of the merged firm and that of the competitor) and increase profits of both (merged and 
non-merging) firms by softening competition.8 However, if the products have multiple units demand 
with a downward sloping demand curve then the bundle can allow the pre-merger consumer surplus 
on one of the products to be extracted by increased prices. If there are network effects the incentive 
to foreclose can be even higher. It can be profitable to exclude the competitor if most of the leveraged 
product customer base requires both products.9 The merged firm offering the bundle can also benefit 
customers especially if there are efficiencies or Cournot effects. 
In order to find a conglomerate concern in a merger it requires a near monopoly in one market (a 
usual dominant position such as 40-50% share is not enough, it may require 80% share). It can be 
useful to ask; why was it not possible for the tying to happen pre-merger – e.g. through some 
contractual arrangement? The size of the market of the competitive product must not be too large 
compared to the market size of the monopoly (leveraging) product to ensure this market can be 
influenced by that product.  
Neven felt that it can be very difficult for a competition authority to tell when competitors are likely 
to exit so this exit situation can be broadly ignored to focus on the situation where the merged firm 
has greater ability to reduce prices (e.g. because the products are complements). However, in general 
when the products are complements there will be less incentive to foreclose because such reduction 
in competition in the tied product may harm the demand for the monopoly product. So harm from a 
conglomerate merger may only occur if the competitor is weak (so not providing a good product) or 
there could be longer term dynamic risks for the merged firm if the competitor is not forced out of 
the market (i.e. it could be a potential competitor in the monopoly market). Neven did not point out 
that if the (tied) market is highly competitive it is unlikely that no firm is producing a good standard 
and nor it is likely that this market is providing a great skill base or profits that would help entry into 
the monopolised market. 
Neven felt that the two main tests for when conglomerate effects should be assessed were; first, the 
observations that the tied (competitive) good market is highly competitive and that the demand for 
the tying (monopoly) good is segmented should trigger an investigation into a possible softening of 
competition. Second, the observation that the tying and tied good are strict complements, that the 
merged entity has an incentive to exclude (e.g. weak competitor) and the prospect of dynamic 
consequences from exclusion should trigger an investigation into a possible exclusion. 
This article explains why this side-lining of the issue of competitor exit to focus on strict complements 
or entering highly competitive markets is confusing for the analysis of conglomerate effects. The first 
section compares the underlying economics of vertical and conglomerate mergers considering the 
incentives and theory of harm as well as how each deal with efficiencies and use margins. The second 
section considers whether conglomerate mergers are likely to lead to an exploitative abuse or price 
rise taking account of the complexities of price discrimination and the possibility of raising rivals costs 
as well as an example of this analysis in a recent UK merger. The third section looks at the techniques 
merged firms can engage in for foreclosure applying the ideas of price discrimination and predation. 
                                                          
8 Neven felt that competition may be softened if there is little differentiation in the competitive market but 
that it is very rare that this market has high enough barriers to entry to make gaining market power 
worthwhile yet has low differentiation. 
9 There must be a large (relative to the total demand for the two products) common pool of customers. 
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The article then reviews the existing ability, incentive, and effect methodology to consider how the 
analysis should be split and adapted including how aspects considered in some guidelines such as 
counter strategies and buyer power can be given a greater role. The article finishes with an adapted 
structure for analysing conglomerate effects and then some conclusions. 
 
Vertical and Conglomerate mergers 
At the time a vertical merger occurs (or has just occurred) the two merging parties are normally 
assumed to be pricing at the profit-maximising level. Consider a firm with market power upstream (for 
example steel) merging with a customer such as a car firm (and adopting input foreclosure). The 
upstream firm (steel) pre-merger is considered to be pricing up to the point where the gain from 
increasing price is matched by the lost margin from losing (car firm) customers. The gain from the 
increased price on the (car) customers it retains is equal to the margin it would earn on sales of all the 
units it would fail to sell either because the (car) customer would buy from an alternative upstream 
(steel) source (or self supply or redesign the product) or those sales the retained (car firm) customers 
lose after having to pass on the original price increase (to consumers).10 When the upstream (steel) 
firm merges with a downstream (car) firm and increases (steel) prices, this price rise is passed on by 
downstream (car) firms and their end consumers switch providers. The upstream (steel) firm not only 
benefits if the switching end consumers buy from an (intermediate car) customer that sources from it 
upstream (in terms of upstream steel margin as it did before). It now also has the opportunity to gain 
the downstream (car assembly) margin on this switched business as well. 
In order for a vertical merger to have a foreclosure effect then the upstream (steel) firm must have 
some market power to be able to increase the costs of the downstream (car) customers and cause 
them to raise their prices to end consumers. The Chicago critique suggests that if the upstream (steel) 
firm is a monopoly then it could already extract all the profit from customers that are dependent on 
its input. Since there is only one monopoly profit to be earned in the supply chain the firm with the 
market power that is the essential partner can extract the whole supply chain amount. One counter-
argument to this has been suggested that the merger can help the upstream firm overcome the 
credibility problem (the ex-post incentive to supply too many downstream (car) firms that lowers the 
willingness of these (car) firms to pay monopoly price for its products). However, it seems unlikely that 
the firm could not build credibility over time in many repeated periods.11 Even if the Chicago critique 
was valid in static markets, conglomerate or vertical mergers could be desirable to remove a potential 
entrant or increase barriers to entry.12 Conglomerate mergers may actually be more desirable to the 
                                                          
10 These leaving customers do not switch to a different (car firm) customer buying from the upstream (steel) 
firm. If the upstream (steel) price rise causes the downstream (car) prices to rise and downstream (end) 
consumers merely move to another (car, downstream) firm that buys from the same upstream (steel) supplier 
then this is not a loss of sales (pre-merger) to the upstream (steel) firm and should be taken into account in its 
profit maximising prices. 
11 This Chicago critique reasoning suggests there is no incentive to merge with a supplier (customer 
foreclosure) and no incentive for a conglomerate mergers (where both firms sell directly to the relevant 
customers pre-merger).  
12 So if a steel supplier was expanding into whole assembled car parts the car firm may merge (customer 
foreclosure if the car firm is the one with market power) with them to stop them re-creating the whole car. 
Similarly a dominant steel firm may be concerned that its market power could be weakened if aluminium firms 
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dominant firm (and the Chicago critique is less likely to apply) because the mere fact that the products 
are (often) sold to the same customers does not mean that the profitability of the two markets are 
linked.13 Thus it is possible for the dominant firm to obtain monopoly rents pre-merger while the other 
merging market is also profitable and there is an incentive to foreclose. 
There are some fundamental differences in how a price rise is implemented in a vertical or a 
conglomerate merger. 
In a vertical merger (input foreclosure) by raising the price of the input to the competing downstream 
suppliers there is a tendency for those firms to be less competitive and thus to increase the profit of 
the other merging firm downstream. However, in a conglomerate merger increasing the price of either 
(individual) merging products post-merger would cause customers to switch away (given that both 
firms are again pricing at the pre-merger profit maximising level) and be unprofitable. These 
customers will switch to competitors of the merging firms or leave that market, but without the 
merged firm creating a new link between the two products provided by the merged firm (e.g. bundling) 
there is no reason why an increase in the price of one would lead to a rise in demand for the other.14  
Conglomerate foreclosure theories usually assume that after the merger the price of the product with 
market power can be increased (when sold on its own) but that this can be obtained for a reduced 
price if the merging firm’s other product is purchased.15 Apart from the fact that raising the stand-
alone price of the leveraging product was loss making pre-merger, this strategy is very unlikely to be 
profitable because: 
1) Customers are likely to react very badly to this pricing strategy (they can see that prices of the 
market power product have risen and they are being “encouraged” or more likely pressured into 
choosing a bundle as a means to try to mitigate the price rise.) This is likely to generate a lot of 
customer resistance.  
2) There may be a significant number of customers that only wish to buy the market power leveraged 
product and do not wish to buy the other. Thus they are unlikely to buy the bundle and will instead 
leave the market causing a loss to the merged firm without any gain.  
                                                          
were able to expand and so could try to eliminate competition in that more competitive market to secure its 
position (via conglomerate foreclosure). 
13 The profits of the firm in the more competitive market could come mainly from customers that do not buy 
the bundle, especially if these are just about sufficient to sustain a firm in the market on their own. Some 
outside of the market sales may happen in vertical mergers as well, but if they are only possible due to the 
fixed costs incurred in the relationship with the monopoly firm these profits could also be captured following 
the Chicago critique. 
14 The products could be (weak) substitutes, i.e. not in the same antitrust market (such as a steel firm and an 
aluminium firm when there are several competitors in each of steel and aluminium); complements such as 
steel and wheels so falls in price of one car input (like steel) may increase car production and lead to more 
wheels being ordered; or independent such as steel and audit services where the level of audit does not vary 
with the level of production. 
15 Assuming that the leveraged product where the market power is being exercised is also available on its own 
as it was before to ensure the merged firm offering is as attractive as possible in this leveraged market. 
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In this way it seems unlikely that a market wide price rise could be profitable in a conglomerate merger 
in the same way it is in a vertical merger. However, the picture is not as clear as this because of 1) 
Price discrimination, 2) Raising rivals costs, and 3) Predation strategy. 
Conglomerate and vertical mergers have other similarities. Vertical mergers often bring with them 
efficiencies such as reduction in double marginalisation (particularly where two-part risk-sharing 
contracts are not possible and so firms are using linear pricing pre-merger). Conglomerate mergers 
between complementary products have a similar effect where the merged firm faces incentives to 
lower prices after the merger. Vertical mergers can bring about cost reductions. Conglomerate 
mergers can also be used to combine products to more effective bundles (economies of scope) or 
bring about falls in transaction costs.  
In the analysis of vertical (input foreclosure) mergers the upstream product needs to be at least 
dominant and this is true of the leveraging product in a conglomerate merger. In a vertical merger the 
margin of the upstream and downstream products is important to understand the incentives to 
sacrifice sales on one market for sales of the other and this interaction is the same in a conglomerate 
merger.16 The relative price of the upstream and downstream products indicates the ease with which 
downstream (end) consumers are likely to be affected by the upstream price changes in a vertical 
merger and the same information will indicate how likely it is that customers will accept the bundle 
instead of the individual products in a conglomerate merger (how valuable is the leveraging product 
compared to the leveraged one). 
Extending the basic economic model to see whether real world conglomerate 
mergers can lead to a static price rise 
1) Price discrimination  
Despite some fundamental differences between the effects of price rises in a vertical and a 
conglomerate setting there are some aspects of conglomerate mergers that may make price rises 
more likely. The first of these is price discrimination. 
In a vertical (input foreclosure) merger there is only one of the merging parties that deals with the 
(end) customers that the firm is seeking to win from the downstream competitors. This firm gains little 
insight from the merger on how to win these customers from its competitors (for instance on how 
much they value the dominant firm’s upstream input). The merged firm may not know whether large 
or small customers are more likely to be attracted from competitors by the firm’s price or product 
advantage. This is different to a conglomerate merger. In a conglomerate merger both merging parties 
have pre-merger been dealing with customers and potential customers. Although the firms may not 
know which of their customers are more likely to move to competitors pre-merger they do know the 
relative importance of the two products to each of their (potential) customers. A customer that has a 
large annual spend on the dominant leveraging product (and a much smaller annual purchase of the 
leveraging product, even if that is from a competitor) would be far more likely to want to maintain its 
                                                          
16 It can be important to consider the static incentive to sacrifice sales in the leveraging product for sales in the 
leveraged product. 
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purchases with the merged firm. This applies even if it means also buying its (smaller) requirements 
from them in the form of a bundle.  
In a vertical merger the upstream and downstream products are normally combined into a bundle in 
fixed proportions and it is possible to say for the whole customer base what proportion of the 
combined purchase is accounted for by the upstream product. In most instances where conglomerate 
effects are raised the customer base is relatively concentrated and often some element of individual 
price negotiation occurs. In conglomerate mergers it is usually possible for the merged firm to look at 
its customer base and split it into three groups. 
1) Customers that are not actual or potential customers of one of the products. If possible these 
customers will continue to be offered individual prices without any bundle offering. 
2) Customers that already buy all their requirements in both products from the merging parties 
– these customers do not need any complicated bundled pricing to win their business and may 
be offered the pre-merger prices. 
3) Customers that buy both products but purchase at least some from a competitor. If the 
merging parties are to foreclose competitors, these are the customers that they will be 
focussing on. 
Thus if a merged firm could split its customer base like this then it would know that prices could not 
be raised to the first group (they do not find the merged firm’s product any more attractive after the 
merger and its pricing power has not increased). The merged firm would be unlikely to raise prices to 
the third group. The merged firm may want to improve its offer to them to encourage them to switch 
more purchases to the bundle especially if competition increases in the market as competitors react. 
Even if for some of these customers the threat of not being able to get one of the products separately 
is enough to push them to the bundle, for many the adverse reaction to being coerced will be too 
strong to make this a successful strategy. Thus if a conglomerate merger were ever to cause a static 
immediate price rise it is likely that it would only affect those customers in group 2 that pre-merger 
were loyal to both merging parties. Price discrimination and an inability to re-sell the product (a 
precondition for price discrimination) would mean that the effects would be unlikely to affect other 
customers.  
If the members of group 2 are a relatively small proportion of the market then the reputational effects 
of the merged firm being seen to take advantage of this group that could spread out to discourage 
other customers using the merged firm would make a price rise strategy very unlikely. This is 
particularly true if the merged firm is also pursuing a foreclosure strategy. If the firm gains a reputation 
for abusing (group 2) customers with high prices then it will be less likely to persuade (group 3) 
customers to switch to their products. The points above about the resistance that the market would 
give to such a (bundle) strategy still applies although if a customer is used to buying both products it 
may be easier to integrate the products in the offering to them and to ensure that they work well 
together. Thus even if the customer could just switch one product it would not want to because of the 
lost synergies. This could increase the transitional or management costs of any switch by making it a 
much more difficult task. It is still unlikely that a conglomerate merger will result in (static) higher costs 
but it is necessary to consider the aspect of whether rivals costs or performance will be affected by 
any bundling. 
2) Raise rivals costs 
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The ability to increase the costs of your rivals makes a static price rise more likely. 
In a vertical (input foreclosure) merger the merged firm may reduce its own prices or costs (for 
instance by reducing double marginalisation) while increasing them for competitors (by refusing to 
supply and raising their input costs). The same can happen to some extent in a conglomerate merger. 
The two products can be integrated and developed post merger to become more efficient. At the 
same time the competitors may have become used to having the products sold separately, seen the 
importance of the dominant leveraging product, and decided to integrate, adapt or configure their 
products to interact and work well with that product. If the merged firm decides to pursue a bundling 
strategy to foreclosure competitors (targeting group 3) or to increase prices statically (targeting group 
2), then it may prevent customers using its dominant leveraging product with products of competitors 
and thus stop those customers using the part of those competitors’ products that had been so adapted. 
This can increase the costs of the competitors to replicate this function with other products or can 
lead to the rivals products being less valuable to customers. Thus rivals costs increase and they are 
partially weakened. 
Will prices rise (immediately) after a conglomerate merger? 
The third complexity of conglomerate mergers mentioned above (predation) relates to a delayed 
harmful effect on prices. Before turning to that, this section will consider whether conglomerate 
mergers are likely to lead to an exploitative abuse. 
So if there are many customers in a market that buy from both merging parties pre-merger, and the 
prices to these customers of the bundled offering can be raised without affecting the prices and sales 
to customers that do not buy both products from the merging parties, will the merged firm increase 
its prices? In particular will it be likely to do this where competitors have become less competitive and 
valuable when they are unable to integrate their product with the dominant leveraging product (their 
costs have been raised).17 In general this is unlikely. First, for the reasons above about reputation and 
that other customers may hear about price rises and be discouraged. The merged firm may also find 
some efficiencies and so its optimum (profit maximising) price could fall. The main reason is that an 
anti-competitive firm is more likely to pursue a foreclosure (lower price) strategy initially. 
If the competitor is weak then a lower price strategy that convinces as many customers to switch as 
quickly as possible and limits the time to react and the period that the low prices need to be offered 
can be profitable for the merged firm.18 If there is an attempt to foreclose the competitor then it may 
compete more aggressively in the short-term which would make a price rise to some customers harder. 
Even if the firm is not forced to exit it may be weakened for the medium to long term (especially if the 
two merging firms are already very strong which is likely if many customers in the market are loyal to 
both of them pre-merger).  
However, if the competitor(s) are not weak this suggests they have a good product and it may be the 
case that they are able to develop an offering that is attractive to the customers that were previously 
loyal to the merged party. Trying to take advantage of these customers may leave the merged firm 
vulnerable to them sponsoring entry or other techniques (there are often large customers with some 
                                                          
17 Alternatively the increased differentiation in the market could soften competition but often the market for 
the leveraged product is already differentiated (and profitable). 
18 Better than trying to charge high prices to some customers immediately 
 9 
buyer power in conglomerate markets with negotiated or discriminatory prices). A third possibility is 
that the loyal customers already purchased most of their combined merged firm purchases from just 
one of the merging parties pre-merger and so the increased market power that the merged firm has 
with these customers is not large. 
Static price rise considered in a conglomerate UK merger case 
Although a static price rise is the usual theory of harm in a merger, and even in a conglomerate merger 
the standard ability, incentive, effect analysis tends to suggest that static price rises are the focus, this 
is often much less important than a type of predation strategy. 19  In vertical mergers a static 
assessment is often done to consider whether the net effect of higher competitor prices and lower 
merged firm prices will harm (end) customers. In a conglomerate merger the main concern is usually 
whether competitors will be weakened or exit and that prices will rise after this event.  
One recent case where a static price rise was actively considered in a conglomerate merger was the 
merger between IRI and Aztec.20 These two firms both provided electronic point of sale “ePoS” data 
to brand owners (i.e. data provided by the retailers to tell the brand owners how their products were 
performing). The only other significant competitor in the UK was Nielsen. Aztec mainly provided 
information on convenience retailers and IRI and Nielsen mainly provided data on the large grocery 
retailers. Some customers sold mainly impulse products and could not afford the grocery data (so only 
bought convenience data). Some customers just bought the grocery data, and some bought both. The 
demand for these two products was approximately independent, but some customers had adapted 
their systems to the two types of data and they were partially integrated so that some features would 
not work if one type of data was not available (there was an element of raising rivals costs if bundling 
prevented access to some data). Aztec had (some) market power in the (much smaller) convenience 
data market and the investigation considered whether this could be leveraged to affect customer 
choices in the grocery data market.  
In this case there were relatively few customers that bought from both IRI and Aztec pre-merger 
(compared to those that were in group 3) and amongst those customers it would be very difficult to 
discover through the merger (anything more about) which customers placed the highest value on the 
bundle and could be exploited with a static price rise.21 Indeed most third parties concerned about 
this issue thought that if Aztec had pre-merger market power it was already exercising this to charge 
a monopoly price. Prices were unlikely to rise further.22 The decision called this “a reduction in choice 
for some customers” (i.e. those that are only offered a bundle) and focussed on whether there would 
be harm to all the customers that had a demand for both the products of IRI and Aztec whether or not 
they were pre-merger buying form the merging parties (group 2) or partly from Aztec and partly from 
Nielsen (group 3). This case was relatively simple because the majority of these were pre-merger 
                                                          
19 Rey and Tirole in the Handbook of Industrial Organisation stated that horizontal foreclosure is normally 
predation which reduces both the predators profit and the profit of others to induce their exit. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1573448X06030330 
20 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/information-resources-inc-aztec-group 
21 The merged firms need to compete strongly for customers that were not already buying both products from 
them. 
22 The competitor was more popular amongst firms that wanted both products than the merging party and it 
was the competitor that was the main outside option in the leveraging market as well as the main outside 
option in the leveraged market. 
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buying from Nielsen who was constraining both merging parties and so to be harmed had to face a 
price rise from Nielsen and the merged firm. This was unlikely because Nielsen was disadvantaged by 
the merger and had to increase its competitiveness to maintain its market position. The high margins 
and fixed costs with some technological changes and investment in the industry made a strategy of 
accommodating lost market share less likely. As the decision states, the fact that conglomerate 
mergers can lead to static (immediate) increases in prices is not really the focus in the merger 
guidelines.  
Although the merger guidelines have the same structure for conglomerate and vertical mergers (both 
are about raising prices or limiting access of competitors so their products are less competitive) 
conglomerate mergers are normally about dynamic effects rather than the static initial price changes. 
Further details of how this static price rise analysis was done can be found in the decision.23 It is 
extremely rare to find any conglomerate merger where an immediate exploitative abuse is considered 
plausible. 
Anti-competitive foreclosure 
Given that static price rises (exploitative abuse) are very unlikely to occur in conglomerate mergers 
the remainder of this article focuses on analysing strategies designed to harm competitors such as 
predation (exclusionary abuse). 
Given that the merged firm is not trying to exploit its customers (at least initially), you can consider 
the pricing strategies that are likely. 
For a regulator to determine if the merged firm can succeed when facing a foreclosure bundling 
strategy (the effects) it is usually best to focus on total foreclosure. Total foreclosure means that if a 
targeted customer wants to buy the leveraging product they will have to buy the leveraged product 
and there is no option of buying individually. If a customer cannot be induced to switch their purchases 
of one product to the merging parties when faced with getting no access at all to the leveraging 
product, then they should not be persuaded by any partial foreclosure. Total foreclosure can also be 
easier for a regulator to explain to end customers in terms of the options they should consider in 
complex hypothetical scenarios. 
Partial foreclosure (offering the leveraging product in two packages so that it costs more to buy 
without the leveraged product) is relevant. In particular it can be useful for overcoming buyer 
power/resistance. If third parties think total foreclosure is unrealistic because a firm would never treat 
its customers in that way then partial foreclosure may be a way of making the same incentives (to 
single source the bundle from the parties) just as desirable to customers while not making the choice 
feel so forced. The attractiveness of the bundled price in overcoming resistance to manipulation is 
particularly strong if there are efficiencies from the merger where the pre-merger individual prices 
remains constant and the harm to competitors merely comes from incentivising customers to switch 
to a cheaper (or more valuable) bundle. 
                                                          
23 See paragraph 237-265. 
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Price discrimination (first/second degree24) 
Although the reputational risks of using strong price discrimination to exploit customers make this 
unlikely. Price discrimination can have more significance for attempts to exclude. 
A merged firm that offers bundled pricing to encourage firms in group 3 to switch some of their 
purchases from competitors to its products does not need to offer the same price to all customers. In 
most of these situations the target customers will be purchasing the dominant leveraging product 
from the merged firm already and the bundle will be to encourage the customer to also buy the 
leveraged product. Although the firm may not know the precise annual spend on competitors’ 
products it is likely to know from its negotiations in the past the quantity (and annual purchases) of 
the dominant product and the desired quantity of the leveraged product. A firm that mostly purchases 
the dominant product and has a relatively small annual spend on the leveraged product can be easily 
persuaded to switch to the merged firm and requires only a limited bundle discount on the pre-merger 
individual prices.25 Some customers may not need a discount from the individual prices to switch 
because of the efficiencies and raising rivals costs effects.26 Although these customers are the easiest 
to persuade to switch they will also have (individually) a relatively limited effect on the targeted 
competitors due to their low leveraged product purchases.  
Due to the leveraged firm’s market knowledge they are likely to know which are the most important 
customers to their competitors and these can be offered much larger discounts to encourage 
switching. Even if customers are benefiting in the short term the merged firm may wish to disguise 
what it is doing (i.e. pricing the competitor out of the market). By only offering the most favourable 
prices to a few firms the merged firm makes the strategy less obvious and less costly. In many markets 
where conglomerate effects are considered many customers will be offered individual prices tailored 
to their use of the two products and how easy the merged firm believes they will be to persuade to 
switch. 
Predation strategy 
Using the techniques of mixed bundling and customer based price discrimination predation and 
exclusion can be a powerful strategy in a conglomerate merger. 
In most conglomerate mergers prices will not rise immediately after the merger, even if the merging 
firms have market power and the merger could potentially harm competition. Thus the most likely 
outcome in these mergers is that any harm will come from the merging parties actually reducing prices. 
Although this action may be unhelpful for competition, even if it leads to exit or weakening of major 
                                                          
24 It will not be full first degree in that there will still be uncertainty, but the combination of taking account of 
quantity demanded (second degree) in both products at the same time (and other available information about 
that customer) with produce a price that may be unique to that customer at least for the most important 
customers in the market. 
25 As noted above, even if it is possible to coerce them into switching purely with aggressive bundled pricing 
this is unlikely to happen as it will damage relations with customers in general. 
26 It is possible that it is easier for the firm to raise rivals costs without this appearing to be coercion, 
particularly if being compatible with the competitors’ products has some cost to the dominant product. 
Alternatively it could just be that the firm develops the product to work particularly well with its own product 
and relative to this compatibility with others is harmed. 
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competitors it is not certain that it will qualify as actual predation on its own. Even if it would be 
considered predation it may be hard to detect or prove predation. 
For pricing to be predatory (in the legal definition of an abuse) it must be below cost and in order to 
establish an efficient cost benchmark the cost of the dominant firm is usually used.27 However, just 
because the pricing causes the (main) competitor to exit and could weaken competition, it does not 
mean it is always predatory according to this legal definition. For instance, the merging firm could gain 
efficiencies from the merger and the competitor may face a rise in their costs, leading to the dominant 
firm having a lower cost than all potential competitors and being able to exclude and force exit of 
competitors without making a loss. Markets where conglomerate effects are most problematic often 
have high economies of scale (high fixed costs of entry or product development) so that the dominant 
firm can reduce price to a few customers without pricing below the marginal costs of supplying those 
customers. The dominant firm may have a much larger customer base to recover market fixed costs 
compared to the competitor. Thus the dominant firm may continue to be profitable (on a variable or 
total cost basis) and may only be pricing aggressively on a small part of the market (targeting some 
key customers for the competitor) while the competitor becomes loss making. Although the dominant 
merged firm strategy may have a predatory intent (i.e. charging low prices now to reduce competition 
and recoup costs of foregone profit with higher prices later), the strict condition of pricing below cost 
may not be met. Even without pricing below cost market power could be increased (via weakening), 
in a way that is sustained when prices rise. 
This predation strategy could still harm customers because of reduced choice (potentially a monopoly 
provider). Although the merged firm’s costs may fall due to efficiencies, prices will not necessarily fall 
due to the reduced competition. Even if a conglomerate merger allowed illegal predatory pricing it 
may be harder for an authority to detect because this involves bundling two products whose individual 
component prices and costs are unclear. The pricing involves individual customer pricing and so it can 
be very time consuming to discover which prices and offers are problematic. 
Motta and Vasconcelos found that a regulator speculating that the merged firm’s delayed efficiency 
gains will make rival firms exit the industry is trading off a (relatively) certain welfare gain with a future 
(and more uncertain) welfare loss (if the firms leave)28. If efficiency gains from the merger are strong 
enough, the final outcome would be positive even if it leads to exit of rivals. The future welfare losses, 
                                                          
27 Following the jurisprudence of the European Court under s.60, predatory conduct is to be regarded as 
predatory where prices are (above average variable cost, (AVC) but) below average total cost (ATC), where it 
can be established that the purpose of the conduct was to eliminate a competitor (i.e. there must be an 
element of intent). Prices below AVC or average avoidable cost (AAC), that only consider the costs caused to 
be incurred by the additional sales made at the low price, indicate that an equally efficient competitor could 
not compete in the market. This assumes that these prices are expected to be maintained for some time and 
are not just a transitory phenomenon. See for example the EC Akzo case, Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v 
Commission [1991] ECR I-3359 or international guidelines on predation. 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc828.pdf. The ICN report states that 
from an economic perspective prices that weaken or harm competitors can be predatory for the purposes of 
recoupment, but in competition literature the term is usually reserved for illegal conduct. 
28 Efficiency gains and myopic antitrust authority in a dynamic merger game, Massimo Motta and, Helder 
Vasconcelos , October 2005. http://www.fep.up.pt/docentes/pcosme/S-E-1/art-h-vasconcelos.pdf 
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if any, are rendered even more uncertain by the presence of possible counter-strategies by the 
outsiders. 
 
Making this (trade-off) assessment is difficult, but the next section looks at how this is done. 
 
Ability, Incentive, and Effect 
Having considered what the most likely theories of harm and complexities in a conglomerate merger, 
this section considers whether the usual analytical framework could be improved. First the position in 
vertical mergers is considered as well as potential issues that have been raised in existing guidelines. 
A competition authority first determines that a merger may lead to a conglomerate bundling or 
foreclosure strategy involving lower prices (or better products) initially followed by adverse effects 
once competition is weakened. Then it applies an analytical structure. Often in the merger non-
horizontal guidelines this is the ability, incentive, and effect structure. With vertical input foreclosure 
applying this structure can be relatively straightforward. The authority considers the ability of the 
upstream firm to raise the costs of the downstream competitors. This is two steps, first considering 
costs in the input market and then translating these into a likely percentage rise in costs on the final 
end product sold by the downstream firms.29 For incentive, first the upstream loss of sales and margin 
is estimated and then an even more uncertain estimate of the likely rise in downstream sales and the 
additional (downstream, static) margin. If the incentive condition is satisfied (which is not necessarily 
the case) then there will be some weakening of competition (because the downstream competitors 
are likely to face higher input costs and have to charge higher prices). To determine effect of this 
strategy the aggregate impact of the lower merged firm prices is compared with the higher prices 
charged by competitors in the rest of the market. Any dynamic impacts were not considered until the 
end. The ability analysis focuses on the upstream input market and how downstream firms and 
upstream input suppliers would react to the foreclosure. This includes the customer reactions to any 
price rise including the amount of pass through and the impact on their sale prices. The incentive 
analysis focuses on end customers and how they would react to the changed downstream prices, 
particularly those customers that would move from competitors to the merged firm. The effect section 
considers all the end customers and how they may interact with other groups like potential entrants. 
Clarifying the question and the analysis at each step 
In conglomerate mergers the classification of the evidence into ability, incentive and effect has not 
always been that easy. The UK merger guidelines explicitly accept that these three questions may not 
be entirely separate and the three questions can overlap.30 However, too much overlap can make the 
                                                          
29 One complexity is that if the integrated vertical firm is able to reduce price in the end customer market. This 
also needs to be calculated so that an approximate worst-case relative price advantage for the merged firm in 
the end customer market can be calculated. 
30 In practice, the analysis of these questions may overlap and many of the factors may affect more than one 
question. Therefore, the Authorities’ analysis of ability, incentive and effect may not be in distinct 
chronological stages but rather as overlapping analyses. So as to reach an SLC finding, all three questions must 
be answered in the affirmative.” 5.6.7, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284449/OFT1254.pdf 
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analysis of conglomerate effects confusing. Too many different strands of evidence and reasoning 
need to be combined ‘in the round’ at a late stage while other questions become almost tautological. 
The UK guidelines suggest that the questions should be split to consider “Would the merged firm have 
the ability to harm rivals, for example through raising prices or refusing to supply them?”31 This has 
often been interpreted broadly, for instance in the consideration of the merger of IRI and Aztec this 
was (in the first (pre-appeal) decision) considered the “Ability of the merging parties to undertake 
such strategies”32. The post appeal decision expressed the question as the “ability of the merged entity 
to foreclose competitors“ which means “Nielsen would either be substantially competitively 
weakened or would exit altogether” 33 . Given that in the market Nielsen was the only material 
competitor pre-merger the effect on Nielsen was effectively an effect on the market and in parts it 
appeared that this condition would only be met where the merged firm had the ability to bring about 
an anti-competitive outcome.  
The European Commission guidelines can also be confusing as the section is headed “Ability to 
Foreclose” and the description says “ability and incentive to leverage a strong market position from 
one market to another by means of tying or bundling or other exclusionary practices” where 
leveraging only requires that sales can be increased in the tied market via this bundle34. This condition 
appears either very easy (ability to raise sales in one product by bundling) which would often happen 
if the other product was turned into a free gift. Alternatively it could be very difficult (ability to 
foreclose) which could be interpreted as the ability to carry out the full anticompetitive theory of 
harm.35  
To ensure more consistency in the analysis of conglomerate mergers with the approach in vertical 
mergers the ability question is perhaps best framed as the ability to draw substantial customers from 
competitors. The analysis should clearly be limited to considering the incentives of customers that 
currently buy the leveraging product from the merged party and the leveraged product from 
competitors (group 3) to switch to the parties and whether the merged firm can ever incentivise such 
a switch (total foreclosure). For the incentive analysis consider all customers buying the leveraging 
product to consider how the profits of the merged firm may be affected by the required strategy. The 
static impacts may still be important to know where any lost customers would divert to (and whether 
they would support the targeted competitors). The incentive question may also help to establish 
whether the required behaviour is likely to involve strictly illegal behaviour (pricing below the merged 
firms own costs and so loss making) or merely profit sacrifice. However, the authority may want to be 
                                                          
31 5.6.6. The examples given in this quote do not normally apply to conglomerate mergers where the merging 
parties do not have contracts directly with (downstream) competitors. 5.6.13 does explain that the main 
theory of harm in a conglomerate merger involves incentivising customers to buy products jointly and putting 
competitors that find it difficult to offer that bundle at a disadvantage. 
32The phrase (would the merged firm have the ability to harm rivals?) was quoted after this statement 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/mergers_ea0
2/2013/Information_Resources.pdf, paragraph 96. The ability section is concluded (in paragraph 113) by 
saying that “there is a moderate number of [grocery ePoS] customers for whom convenience ePOS data is 
likely to be important. These customers appear to account for a disproportionate fraction of revenue and are 
therefore valuable customers.”  
33 https://assets.digital.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/media/54944b9be5274a42900002fa/IRI_Aztec_Full_text_decision.pdf. Paragraph 132. 
34 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008XC1018(03)&from=EN Paragraph 91. 
35 Paragraph 29 actually describes foreclosure merely as “where actual or potential rivals' access to supplies or 
markets is hampered” and thus their ability and incentive to compete is reduced. 
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wary of even behaviour that does involve static losses (and so would traditionally fail the incentive 
test) if it considers that the anti-trust deterrence to such predatory strategy behaviour is not complete. 
The effect section then looks more closely at the position of the targeted competitors, their cost base 
and viability considering their whole customer base (including those not buying the leveraging product) 
and whether they can remain in the market. This would shift how conglomerate cases are normally 
considered because some basic details considered early on for whether concerns are likely may not 
be considered until effects. This would include the proportion of the customer base of the two 
(bundled) products that is common to both products. 
Potentially Illegal strategy required 
 
Both UK and EC merger guidelines explain that the theory of harm in a conglomerate merger may 
involve conduct that could itself be illegal under competition law. The UK guidelines consider 
whether ”foreclosure may involve behaviour that is unlawful under competition law”, the likelihood 
of detection and the deterrence effect of any punishment.36 In the EC guidelines, the possibility of the 
conduct being unlawful will affect the incentives of the merged firm to engage in it37 These guidelines 
do not discuss the precise differences between illegal behaviour (e.g. loss-making) and other 
seemingly predatory strategies relying on short-term sacrifice of profits followed by later recoupment. 
Dynamic effects and counter strategies 
 
The EC guidelines consider “whether there are effective and timely counter-strategies that the rival 
firms may deploy. One such example is when a strategy of bundling would be defeated by single-
product companies combining their offers so as to make them more attractive to customers”. The 
vertical section suggests counter strategies could include “changing their production process so as to 
be less reliant on the input concerned or sponsoring the entry of new suppliers upstream”. All these 
strategies appear to be considered at the end of the analysis. Actually all these counterstrategies are 
most relevant to the ability analysis since they consider whether (given the market power that the 
merged firm has in the leveraging product) the competitor can circumvent that by obtaining it 
elsewhere (a rival bundle or sponsoring entry) or enable its customers to manage without it (by a 
redesign). Counter strategies could also be relevant to incentive and effect. In incentive when 
observing the customer reactions to bundled offers the competitors may be able to make rival offers 
and reduce prices to customers believed to be at risk of switching. Competitors may agree long-term 
contracts to support the business and encourage customers to be concerned about the long-term 
industry impact. In effect the basic counter strategy for competitors is to win customers to replace 
those lost from the bundling strategy. These customers are most likely to be those that do not require 
a bundle and only want the leveraged product. There could also be other counter strategies to expand 
or to reduce or recover fixed costs to prevent the firm leaving the market. 
Price discrimination impact on the Incentive condition 
The possibility of price discrimination in the market also has an important impact on the Incentive 
condition when considering anticompetitive conglomerate foreclosure. The merged firm can often 
                                                          
36 5.6.14 
37 “When the adoption of a specific conduct by the merged entity is an essential step in foreclosure, the 
Commission examines both the incentives to adopt such conduct and the factors liable to reduce, or 
even eliminate, those incentives, including the possibility that the conduct is unlawful” paragraph 110. 
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offer the customers that it wants to target an individual price. The markets where conglomerate issues 
are considered often have few opportunities for customers to re-sell the products and competitors 
can be dependent on relatively few large customers that receive tailored prices. If the only customers 
being offered (and pressured into) the bundled contract are those the merged firm believes it can win 
and only to the extent necessary to get them to accept the offer, it should always be in the merged 
firm’s interest to make such bundled prices available. These offers always win at least some customers 
and will not cause any customers to leave (because these customers are not offered bundles). Thus it 
is often the case in conglomerate mergers with price discrimination that the incentive condition is 
almost trivially met even without considering the dynamic sacrifice strategy of weakening a 
competitor. The competitors may try to counter this incentive by reducing prices and competing 
strongly for the customers (expected to be) targeted but they will always know less about these 
customers than the merging parties that supply both the products of interest. Competitors may also 
try to damage the merged firm’s reputation in relation showing its willingness to bundle or pressure 
some customers to buy the bundle due to fear of losing pre-merger freedom to mix and match 
providers. Often these issues will be more theoretical arguments and it is difficult to place weight on 
them ex-ante. Thus the incentive condition will normally be met in any conglomerate merger (at least 
if there is enough concern to warrant a thorough review). 
Strength of buyers and competitors 
Given the importance of a few large buyers to the success of the targeted competitors, buyer power 
may be more important in a conglomerate merger than in many other mergers. In most mergers 
where price discrimination is possible the presence of large buyers does not protect smaller ones. 
However, in a conglomerate merger it is not the price offered to the smaller buyers by the competitor 
that is important as much as the mere presence of the competitor and competition in the market. 
Thus if the large buyers have enough foresight to support the higher cost competitors even if it may 
be in their short-term interest to accept a tempting bundle from the merged firm, then competition 
in the market can be protected. Considering how the key buyers are likely to react to any bundled 
pricing is thus a key exercise in any merger and can be very time consuming because each buyer will 
have different incentives to accept the bundle and different views on whether this is in their interest. 
It may even be that some buyers instead use foresight to share in the profits of the merged firm by 
securing a good value long-term deal with the merged firm that they realise their competitors will not 
be able to achieve once competition in the conglomerate market is reduced. Thus important buyers 
may see this as a way of securing a competitive advantage in the downstream market and the market 
is not protected. 
Conglomerate effects will only be a concern where the competitor that is being harmed by the 
behaviour is at serious risk. This will usually mean that there is only one or very few (effective) 
competitors in that market because if several firms can operate effectively it is likely that there are 
few economies of scale and it will be very difficult for the merged firm to substantially eliminate 
competition. If the merged firm is only able to eliminate some of the effective competitors then it may 
be that although some competitors are harmed, competition is not harmed. If smaller firms are 
effective competitors then they are likely to be able to find some customers who are less affected by 
the bundling strategy and survive in the market. 
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A proposed means of analysis in conglomerate mergers 
Combining the principle of getting each of ability, incentive and effect to look at different (mutually 
exclusive) evidence and adapting at each stage to consider the dynamic effects, one way to analyse 
conglomerate effects could be as follows.  
First consider the merged firm’s ability to draw customers away from the leveraged product 
competitors with a tying/bundling strategy. The leveraged product firm obtains via the merger a 
product (the leveraging one) of value that competitors cannot obtain (difficult to replicate). How 
persistent would this ability be if competitors did not react (e.g. does it depend on expiring patents). 
Counter-strategies should be considered that reduce the ability to draw customers away including the 
ability of competitors to replicate the leveraging product offering or adapt their product to manage 
without the leveraging product. Factors to consider include how distinctive the leveraging product 
offering is, do the same customers buy both products, and is the value they place on the leveraged 
product relatively small compared to the leveraging product value. There may also be efficiencies that 
make the bundle even more attractive at drawing customers from competitors (increase ability). 
Then consider the incentive to offer bundled products. Usually where there exists the ability to draw 
substantial customers away from competitors by the bundling strategy and price discrimination is 
possible via individual negotiations, then the incentive condition will be passed. If it is not possible to 
price discriminate then the incentives of all the customers that buy both products or all the customers 
that buy the leveraging product may have to be considered together. The analysis can consider how 
easy it is to identify the customers’ willingness to pay for the bundle, what pricing (in terms of new 
restrictions on buying products separately or price reducing discounts) would be used, and how likely 
these are to have reputational or other (e.g. contractual) effects. Counter-strategies to make the 
offering of discounts less attractive may include using price discrimination to increase competition for 
customers targeted by the merged firm, or whether competitors could raise awareness of the 
potential harm caused by a bundling strategy amongst influential customers. There may be cases 
where even if it is not in the short-term interest of the merged firm to engage in bundling then it may 
be in their interest if they feel they can cause a weakening of competition. 
Despite establishing that the merged firm can harm competitors by drawing their customers away and 
that it has the incentive (is likely) to do this, it is not clear that the behaviour will harm consumers. 
Thus in the effect section there is a need to consider all the customers using the leveraged product 
and the impact on the competitors of losing the customers likely to switch to the bundle. This analysis 
should consider the profitability and whether the offering of the competitors is likely to be weakened 
(in the eyes of customers to reduce the level of competition) prior to any actual exit. The competitors’ 
internal documents may illustrate how likely they are to exit the market (e.g. what wider strategic 
value operating in this segment has for the rest of their operations and what would need to happen 
for them to exit). If they lost customers in one market would this reduce the revenue the firms earn 
in other markets and lead to further incentive to stay in the market. Is there any history of the 
competitor exiting other markets in similar situations that may make an exit more likely this time. The 
counter strategies allow competitors to maintain service despite fewer customers. These include ways 
for the competitors to win customers that do not require the leveraging product, develop new 
products, or cut costs (particularly fixed costs) so that they can continue to operate competitively with 
a smaller customer base. 
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Conclusion 
 
When considering mergers, competition authorities are normally worried about rising prices (or 
reductions in non-price aspects of the product or service offering). This is the case in unilateral or 
coordinated effects. In vertical mergers although the merged firm integrated end customer price may 
fall, any harm comes from price rises or foreclosure of competitors. This article argued that there is 
very rarely any likelihood of prices rising when a conglomerate merger occurs. In the rare cases where 
such issues have been investigated they normally involve a market where most customers (pre-merger) 
are loyal to the products of both merging parties and the merging parties are not concerned about 
adverse reputational impacts causing rival products to be developed.  
Thus in the rare cases where a conglomerate merger is harmful it is because the merged firm is 
expected to improve its product so much (by efficiency or price cut). It will then leverage this benefit 
to target a competitor’s customers, so the competitor exits (or is weakened), and then prices can rise 
to a level that recoups the lost profit and results in prices being higher than they would be pre-merger. 
Thus it is a kind of predatory strategy that relies on the sacrifice and recoupment of profit. Some 
authorities will argue that such behaviour should be prevented by ex-post enforcement. If a predatory 
(below cost) price is offered react then, not at the time of the merger. However, it may be difficult to 
detect and prosecute such a pricing strategy particularly when it involves bundled pricing and (some) 
merger efficiencies or new products. Also it is not clear that the same intervention threshold should 
apply to mergers as to competition enforcement. 
In competition enforcement regulators are understandably reluctant to discourage innovation, firms 
entering new markets and developing new products or new efficiencies. Thus they are careful before 
punishing firms for competing and offering more attractive products to customers (which authorities 
normally support). In a merger regulators are also reluctant to block or remedy mergers that bring 
efficiencies and increased competition and will always be understandably reluctant to accept 
unsubstantiated claims by competitors that want less competition in their markets, but it is still the 
case that the costs of intervention are lower in a merger than in an enforcement case and the legal 
standards of proof are often lower.38 Remedying a prospective merger does not involve any fine for 
the parties and does not involve as much cost (especially if integration has not started) so that even 
with the more uncertainty of a prospective ex-ante assessment there may be cases where it is better 
to deal with the issues in the merger analysis than try to recreate competition later. 
Some potential harms caused by leveraging a dominant position are not possible to prevent via 
enforcement (they would not be considered or proved to be illegal), but can be guarded against in a 
merger case.39 Just because the merged firm does not charge a loss making price on any product does 
not mean that consumers benefit from the low prices. Sometimes consumers would benefit from 
higher prices or lower efficiencies that gave competitors more chance to survive and develop their 
products (and competition). A notable example where an offering that was potentially an efficiency 
was stopped is the European Commission investigation of Microsoft’s pricing of its web browser 
                                                          
38 The EC guidelines also confirm that “Tying and bundling as such are common practices that often have no 
anticompetitive consequences. Companies engage in tying and bundling in order to provide their customers 
with better products or offerings in cost-effective ways.” Para 93. 
39 It may also be possible to deal with these aspects in more general competition tools such as market 
investigations in the UK, but these take a lot of additional resource. 
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Internet Explorer.40 Internet Explorer was potentially sold below cost (it was given away for free with 
Windows operating system) but this was not the bundle aspect that was remedied.41 The fact that 
users obtained Internet Explorer pre-loaded on PCs (arguably an efficiency that did not make it any 
harder to load rival products) was remedied to make the PC set up process slightly longer and require 
an active choice of web browser. If all browsers had been offered for free and then a merger between 
Windows and Internet Explorer had given the possibility of efficiently pre-loading would a competition 
authority have the foresight to remedy this aspect of the transaction (prospectively) before the 
supposed efficiency (pre-loading) could be implemented given the potential anti-business message of 
preventing efficiencies? 
Even without bundled pricing, a conglomerate merger that merely introduces a strong efficiency that 
makes the leveraged product of the merged firm much more valuable when consumed alongside the 
leveraging product (and thus induces switching) can be harmful to the market in the long term (but 
only rarely). 
Thus it is very important to be careful when considering conglomerate effects and in trying to 
determine which cases really deserve a closer look it is always worth considering the risk of making 
the wrong decision. If the full force of the bundle is applied how convincing is the competitor exit (or 
very substantial weakening). In the Internet Explorer case there were network externalities that meant 
that a smaller market share would lead to lower demand and possibly reduced development support 
or product improvements. In other markets it is necessary for the competition agency to be very 
sceptical of any story of exit. In fact conglomerate effects may only result in remedies where the 
potentially targeted competitors have been loss-making or actively considered exit in the pre-merger 
competitive conditions (but were still a strong option for customers). Authorities should also consider 
situations where rival’s costs could be raised significantly or where a serious weakening of the 
competitive offering of the only remaining competitor (or even an exit from a market segment) 
appears likely. While it is also important to consider aspects such as the relative size of overlapping 
customers and the relative size of the two markets, these competitor sense checks can be an 
important early warning system or screen without the authority having to understand the incentives 
of all the many individual customers in the market that may switch in response to hypothetical 
bundled pricing offers. 
                                                          
40 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-352_en.htm. Pre-installing free applications when licensing 
software is also a potential concern in the European Commission investigation into Google’s agreement 
concerning Android. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4782_en.htm. 
41 Some guidelines say conglomerate mergers are less of a concern where the products are not complements. 
In this case it is not clear that the two bundled products were strong economic complements. 
